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            Abstract 
The avalanche of plantation strikes which took place during early months of 1960 initiated the successive strike 
waves which plagued Kenya’s decolonisation process. The lifting of the Emergency and the announcement of a 
transition period to African majority government in January 1960 was marked by a new confidence. After years 
of draconian discipline, estate workers embraced trade unionism and moved into their first organised struggles 
over wages and conditions. They were joined by unrestricted former Mau Mau detainees and the victims of 
land consolidation who entered the plantation work force. The arousal of high expectation fuelled the strikes 
that engulfed the plantation districts of Kenya’s Central Province during the approach to independence. These 
events took place against a background of severe crisis within world coffee markets. Faced by this, European 
coffee growers attempted to compensate themselves by rationalising the plantation economy at the expense of 
their workers. This was met by fierce resistance from plantation labourers which was only eventually tamed as 
union leaders struggled to arrest the movement and surrender organisational autonomy to the state.  
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Introduction 
     The spread of plantation unionism during the Kenya’s approach to independence [1963] was 
propelled forward by the generalised upsurge and recovery of the colony’s trade unions from the  
repressive conditions of the Emergency which was lifted in January, 1960. However, the emergence of 
trade unionism within the coffee plantation districts of Central province was also fundamentally rooted 
in the global crisis of the coffee commodity and its impact on the fortunes of Kenya’s principal industry.  
     Following the 1930s depression, the recovery of Kenya’s coffee production was lifted by wartime 
price supports until international commodity prices rose in the late forties. The demand for coffee kept 
well ahead of supply and led to peak prices in 1955. Thereafter, the sellers market came to an abrupt end 
and the ensuing period became one of deepening financial crisis for most coffee producing countries, 
who nonetheless continued to increase their production bringing on a glut in world markets.2  This 
unleashed internecine  struggles amongst coffee producing states for larger slices of a contracting 
market. The gargantuan stockpiles of Brazil and Columbia in particular, overshadowed the stability of 
world markets. The prospect of an economic catastrophe, following the release these surplus stocks, 
increasingly preoccupied Kenya’s colonial government which was dependent on tax revenues derived 
from the coffee industry. Nonetheless, the increased costs incurred by the Mau Mau Emergency made 
the government less able to support the industry. This left the settlers exposed when coffee prices fell 
from the mid-fifties, with many barely able to recover their costs of production. From then on, the 
colonial government, in a bid to save its tax base, was compelled to promote the African peasant 
producer, who had the potential to cultivate Kenya’s reputedly high quality coffee much more cheaply. 
However, the subsequent restructuring, facilitated by the Swynnerton Plan, risked unwelcome and 
untoward changes as European growers and plantation companies, in a desperate bid to keep their 
heads above water, were pressured into passing their crisis onto the African workforce.  
     For producers of high-quality arabicas3 such as Kenya, maintaining and improving their quality 
became a particularly important, though difficult task under adverse conditions of falling prices when 
competition was at its fiercest. There were several reasons for the drop in quality. Alongside the 
increased incidence of leaf rust and coffee berry disease, coffee growers had suffered bad weather for 
several seasons and there was a marked tendency amongst growers to allow their trees to overbear.4    
Then there was also a widespread incidence of hard pressed casual field workers picking unripe green 
cherry to make up a debe5, thus undermining the crops reputed quality. This was in response to low 
picking rates and rationalised working practices brought on by the productivity drive on Kenya’s coffee 
plantations.6 These issues were compounded by the persistent problems that had arisen during the 
Emergency relating to the increased employment of female and child labour which was extended to fill 
the huge gap in the workforce left by the mass detention and restrictions placed upon the employment 
of Kikuyu males, amongst whom were a substantial cadre of experienced plantation workers. This had 
left a skills defecit as they were withdrawn from the labour market.  
     The government’s attempt to harness the productive energies of African farmers, intensified the 
economic pressures on European coffee planters who then lobbied for the lifting of outstanding 
Emergency restrictions on the employment of former detainees which had prevented them from 
entering plantation employment. The demand for Kikuyu labour power was largely determined by a 
pressing need to tap their rich experience of coffee growing and plantation work. This was an abrupt 
departure from previous settler demands on the government to remove ‘Mau Mau’ from the coffee 
estates. This about turn was brought on as the employers, compressed in a vice like grip between 
overseas and domestic competitors, struggled to sustain the reputed high quality of Kenya’s coffee. 
However, their attempt to put higher quality labour power in place was coupled with a generalised 
productivity offensive to achieve lower production costs. This involved a drive to increase the rate of 
exploitation by lengthening and intensifying the working day with no proportionate increase in wages. 
This course provoked an avalanche of plantation strikes fuelled by the unrestricted entry of thousands of 
erstwhile Mau Mau detainees onto the labour market in Central province, the site of the colony’s coffee 
plantation districts.  
     Overall, the globally induced crisis of the coffee commodity coalesced with the lifting of employment 
restrictions on former Mau Mau detainees, many also victims of land consolidation, a process which 
proceeded apace as the Emergency period drew to a close. As thousands of unrestricted landless Kikuyu 
poured onto the labour market and into plantation work7, the employers and the Labour Department 
were confronted with wage dependent labourers with little or no subsidy from the ‘native land unit’. 
These workers tended to regroup and reorganise themselves, a process which stirred the resurgence of 
the labour movement8, which spread onto the plantations. Changes in the organisation and regulation of 
the commodity chain, which were globally driven, were decisive in reconfiguring the economic and 
social relationships in which an organised working class emerged throughout the plantation economy. 
Overall, the transition to independence was characterised by successive and widespread strike waves 
which presented the outlines of a developing working class movement which was subsequently 
straitjacketed by a panoply of repressive labour laws, a move initiated by Tom Mboya, Kenya’s foremost 
labour leader .9  
 
Origins of the Plantation Unions 
     Towards the end of the Emergency representatives and spokesman for agricultural employers were 
anticipating an upsurge as they witnessed the recovery of Kenya’s trade unions from years of repression 
evidenced by the dramatic and escalating number of working days lost to strikes after 1957. There was 
evident dismay amongst those who had actively lobbied for the lifting of restrictions on former 
detainees, expecting recent experience to have cowed the latter into submission. At a meeting of the 
Coffee Board of Kenya [C.B.K.] in March 1958, some delegates argued that if employers should organise 
themselves ahead of the workers, ‘they would only invite and speed-up workers organisations’. The 
majority however, ‘emphasised urgency’ and were ‘completely in favour’ of establishing a standing 
committee concerned with industrial relations to confront their new adversary, and ‘that this act by the 
Coffee Industry would give a lead to other agricultural employers to do the same sort of thing.’10 This 
resolve was strongly underlined by the President of the Kenya National Farmers Union who warned 
farmers in August 1958 that “growth of African trade unions in farms is a greater challenge than 
anything we have met in this country before”. Appealing to farmers everywhere to close ranks, he 
exhorted that the “threat to you of agricultural trade unionism is greater than that of drought, disease or 
flood”, and warned his audience that “we must therefore have a weapon to meet this challenge of trade 
unionism on the farms. The K.N.F.U. is the farmers only weapon to meet this challenge. Union must be 
met with union …”.11  
     Whilst the Labour Department shared these anxieties, it embraced the inevitability of agricultural 
trade unionism. The key issue for the department was managing grievances by transforming them into 
negotiable issues. To this end, it attempted to steer restive plantation labourers into an architecture of 
wage fixing and industrial relations already established elsewhere12 during the Emergency under 
conditions where the trade union movement had been severely weakened with many militants and 
officials locked up in detention.13 The Labour Department now faced the more formidable task of 
putting this apparatus of formal bargaining machinery into place in the face of an expectant upsurge, 
under conditions where erstwhile restrictions had been lifted. Otherwise, it courted the risk of 
independent workplace organisation emerging, beyond the reach and beneath the vision of the state, 
with its roots in migrant labour and community networks that had been politicised by Mau Mau. How 
could labour officers manage the conflicts to come where no organisation was visible and where no 
obvious leadership could be identified?  
     The collusion between the employers and the Labour Department in founding rural trade unions14 
was also bound to political concerns. There was a concerted effort to insulate workers from political 
organisation by reducing their horizons to the sphere of ‘industrial relations’. As plantation workers 
began to organise themselves against the employers productivity drives and to advance their own 
demands for improved wages and conditions, they also became politicised by the moves towards 
independence. Furthermore, the reintegration of large numbers of Mau Mau detainees into the 
workforce15 stood to heavily influence the political direction that plantation labourers would take. This 
proletarianisation was brought on by the land consolidation of the previous decade which left thousands 
of Kikuyu landless and available for work.16  
     Prompted by the Labour Department, the move to form plantation unions seems to have been the 
outcome of exchanges within the Federation of Kenya Employers [F.K.E.] Rural Employers Committee 
with some involvement from the Kenya Federation of Labour [K.F.L]. Whilst these employers were often 
at odds with each other in their scramble for labour power from the reserves, they came together to 
arrest the spread of agricultural trade unionism by establishing ‘unions’ under their wing from the start. 
A decision was reached to form individual plantation unions for the tea, coffee and sisal sectors. Three 
organising secretaries were appointed and financed by the International Federation of Plantation and 
Agricultural Workers and a British T.U.C. official, David Barrett, was seconded to assist the fledglings.17 
The three plantation unions emerged almost simultaneously, all with identical constitutions. The K.F.L. 
was closely involved from the outset and assigned Jesse Gachago18 as its plantation organiser to shepard 
them. The headquarters of the newly formed coffee and sisal unions was established in Thika township 
where they shared the same office. Thika was already developing into a locus of union power where 
branches representing workers in transport, distribution, retail, construction, tailoring and textile 
industries had recently established themselves and formed a trades council to coordinate their 
activities.19 As the plantation unions emerged, the district’s Labour Officer John Watts, in a tone of 
resignation, reported that ‘employees in these industries will give considerable support to the unions, 
and it is apparent that the Kikuyu is becoming increasingly conscious of the power that might be 
exercised through organised labour movements.’20  
     The earliest battles of the plantation unions were fought over the  right to organise and freedom of 
assembly. They ran up against considerable obstacles ‘as the administration  were not prepared to give 
permission to hold open air meetings’21 and there were no halls large enough for an indoor convention. 
This was affirmed in the K.F.L.’s request for the use of Thika Football Stadium for a mass meeting which 
was met with a ‘blunt refusal’ from Thika Urban District Council, which discounted trade unionism in 
declaring  the stadium’s use for solely African ‘welfare purposes’.22 The District Commissioner, fearing 
that an uninvited audience would show itself, refused to grant the unions’ a licence for an ‘open air’23 
convention anywhere else in the area. Jesse Gachago anticipated a gathering of about 5,000 workers, of 
what was to be the inaugural meeting of the coffee and sisal unions, but no hall in the township could 
possibly accommodate such a number. The gathering was eventually held at Kenya Canners Hall, on 
November 22nd 1959. By restricting the unions to an enclosed venue, the intention was to reduce the 
size of the audience and the impact of trade unionism, so that what was to have been a mass meeting 
became a much smaller affair with ‘about’ 400 persons inside the hall and ‘approximately’ 290 persons 
outside.24  
     During the course of the meeting the aims of the organisations relating to wages, pensions and 
improved working conditions were explained and there were appeals to the assembled workers to join 
up. Union constitutions were also read out. The speakers were Barrett, Gachago and the newly founded 
Coffee Plantation Workers Union [C.P.W.U.] general secretary Godwin Wachira. Barrett drew attention 
to the growth of the plantation unions in Tanganyika which had emerged ‘in a very short time’ and 
enrolled 60,000 workers, and that  similar developments were expected in Kenya. Barrett also referred to 
the Kericho Valley where despite stiff opposition from the tea plantation companies, ‘most of the 
workers’ were willing to join the union. Gachago ‘asked the audience if they had understood and if they 
agreed to join the unions - they all replied that they were willing to join the unions’, and then appealed 
to everyone ‘to recruit as many members as they could.’ Entrance to the Union was set at 5/- a head and 
monthly subs were fixed at 1/-. The plantation unions were shortly registered under the Trade Union 
Ordinance. 25 
      The C.B.K. believed it ‘hardly a coincidence’ that ‘within a matter of days’ of the C.P.W.U. opening its 
offices in Thika ‘the labour on several estates came out on strike although the union officer denied that 
any strike had been called’. The C.B.K. referred disparagingly to ‘the present level of education of many 
coffee labourers’ to whom ‘union membership and strike action are synonymous terms.’26 This was 
entirely true, though what the inverted logic of the employers presented as backward represented a leap 
forward. However, whilst workers claimed the union as their own, there was as yet little consciousness 
of its designated role as a responsible managing agent of discontent, since once they enrolled, the union 
apparatus worked overtime to arrest the spontaneity of the movement entering its ranks. 
 
A Qualitative Leap Forward   
     The Labour Department thought that 1960 ‘was remarkable for its unprecedented number of trade 
disputes’.27 More than half of all strikes occurred in agricultural undertakings, mostly on coffee estates in 
Central Province. These were initially, ‘almost exclusively’28 in Thika district where the months from 
January to April were the peak period of strike action. During this time, the district was the site of 42 
strikes involving 12,239 workers, as a result of which some 1,038,245 hours were lost.29 Whereas in 1959, 
just eight strikes had occurred in the district with the loss of 12,401 man hours, the initial eight disputes 
alone of 1960 incurred a loss of 48,847 hours. Notably, there were two major industrial strikes during the 
course of the year at Kenya Canners and E.A.Bag and Cordage, both processing factories situated in the 
heart of plantation country. Those estates which had parallel coffee and sisal plantations were the most 
prone to concomitant strike action.  
     The Labour Department believed that such a ‘terrific spate of strikes’ was due ‘partly to the advent’ of 
trade unionism, ‘which served to give rise to a new spirit of militancy among workers.’30 In Thika, the 
Labour Office reported employers ‘grave concern’ at the way plantation unions were developing in the 
district, and were convinced that ‘they are more political than anything else.’31 The combativity of 
workers was awakened everywhere as the last repressive constraints of the Emergency were lifted. This 
new mood was infused with political immediacy by the British Government’s declaration of intent  to 
hand over power to an African majority administration. The arousal of expectations of land and jobs to 
follow had an inestimable impact.32 Taking stock of the upsurge, the Governor of Kenya, Sir Patrick 
Renison, was in ‘little doubt that political fever sweeping the country throughout the year had a 
deleterious effect on farm labour’.33  Towards the middle of the year, the general state of labour unrest 
on coffee estates ‘had assumed serious proportions’, evidenced by widespread go-slows and wild cat 
strikes which posed a direct threat to the coffee harvest.34  
      These disputes contained powerful strains of retribution directed at nyaparas35, ‘usually a long 
service headman with loyal emergency record’36, and demands for their dismissal came to the fore in 
more than half the plantation strikes that occurred. The increasingly harsh nature of supervision 
compounded the depth of grievance against such individuals.37 This was of course bound up with the 
increased rates of productivity that coffee planters were attempting to impose in order to compete with 
African smallholders and their overseas rivals in a declining world market. Typically, where labour 
officers were able to ascertain grievances, wage claims and demands for the reduction of tasks and hours 
were advanced alongside this challenge to supervision. Calls for the removal  of nyaparas were, in some 
instances, also bound to challenges for some control over the labour process itself, with workers on 
several estates insisting on setting tasks themselves independently of the management. Many strikes 
were also provoked by victimisations and advanced demands for the reinstatement of sacked activists.38 
Overall, the Labour Commissioner, W.R.C.Keeler, and his deputy, Ian Husband, were deeply concerned 
by the difficulties faced by field officers in determining particular causes and grievances. They were 
uneasy at the evident determination of the many strikers to risk their jobs in a struggle for union rights, 
and acutely aware of the political context of the disputes and their spreading potential during a volatile 
period of decolonisation.39 
 
Silhouettes of the Strike Movement  
    Of the many strikes that occurred, the significance of the dispute at Shortlands estate in Thika district, 
which began on January 2nd 1960, when eighty-four Kikuyu labourers came out on strike, was widely 
recognised. The strikers included 49 men and 36 women, were mostly members of the C.P.W.U. They 
later complained that the headman had refused to issue their rations and warned them against the union 
and because ‘it was the same thing as joining Mau Mau’40. The  local chief, Pithon  Macharia, made his 
way to the estate and ‘started interrogating the workers one by one’, questioning them about their union 
membership. He then ordered them back to work and ‘installed a guard of Tribal Police as riot squad 
around the workers housing’ on the estate, a move which drew the union’s protest to the District 
Commissioner at the interference ‘with workers affairs by your chief’.41      
     When the manager rejected Gachago’s assistance to resolve the dispute, on the grounds that the union 
was not recognised by the coffee industry, the strikers stood firm and insisted that they would only go 
back after the manager had met with Gachago to investigate their grievances. John Watts, the district 
officer then intervened in an attempt to bypass the union by supervising the election of workers 
representatives for a meeting with the manager and Colonel C.V.Merritt, chairman of the C.B.K.’s labour 
committee. When the district’s labour inspector arrived for the meeting42, he found Gachago ‘delivering 
two bags of posho, one bag of potatoes, and a debe of cooking oil’ to the strikers. Seeing his car in the 
labour lines, the estate owner went after Gachago and reproached him for venturing onto the estate  
‘without permission....’43. Merritt later insisted that he would not invite Gachago to ‘any discussions’ 
until the union had been officially recognised.44 As both sides locked horns, the manager issued a return 
or be sacked ultimatum, but the strikers were in no mood to back down. Gachago’s ambition to broker 
the dispute remained as undented as Watts’ desire to exercise mediation as he persuaded Colonel Meritt 
to meet them at Thika’s Labour Office.45  
     This was the union’s first formal contact with an employers’ representative, and the ‘informal 
discussions’46 which followed almost certainly influenced Thika’s planters as their representatives 
arranged to convene ‘as result of the considerable increase in trade union activity in this district of 
late…’47 On January 13th, the Thika Area Labour Committee went into session with the Shortlands strike 
and the issue of union recognition dominating the agenda. The delegates from Makuyu, Mitubiri, Donyo 
Sabuk, Ruiru and Kiambu together with officers from the Labour Department were preoccupied by ‘the 
situation brought about by the development of this union.’ The C.P.W.U. was believed to be taking up a 
‘large number’ of grievances and to have a membership of around 1,700.48 Merritt reminded the 
assembled that only 30% of planters in the district had fully implemented the C.B.K.’s proposals for 
wages and conditions of employment published in July 1959, a situation which he believed was fuelling 
the growth of the union. The meeting backed the Shortlands refusal to negotiate with the C.P.W.U. until 
it was recognised, urged that strikers ‘could not be allowed to remain on the estate indefinitely’, and 
recommended that the manager instruct them ‘to report first thing Friday morning for discharge’ whilst 
offering to take back anyone ‘electing to return to work’, otherwise everybody else was ‘to be off the 
estate by Monday morning.’49 The committee was adamant that eviction orders be served on anyone 
refusing to comply.  
     The issue of union recognition was to be postponed until the employers had recovered their strength 
sufficiently to dictate its terms, as there was a general consensus that to make concessions during a 
period of instability would pose great dangers to themselves. The meeting finally agreed to form an 
employers association, the Kenya Coffee Growers Association  [K.C.G.A.], ‘with the least possible 
delay’50, which ‘made rapid strides’ during March-April. In response to the spread of the C.P.W.U. on 
the plantations, the owners flocked into the organisation. During the course of July 1960 the K.C.G.A. 
swelled from 170 members representing some 28,500 acres of coffee to 249 farming an acreage of 39,251 
from a total of 50,700 acres under coffee plantings. While the planters were often at each others throats in 
a competitive sense, the role of the K.C.G.A. was to uphold and preserve their essential interests in face 
of both the working class on the plantations and the state when it strayed from acting in their interests. 
The advent of the K.C.G.A. was essentially a move to represent the interests of the planters in face of 
heated competition at home and from abroad, to regulate conflicts of interest between themselves, to 
centralise industrial relations in the industry, and to defend their position in trade disputes with their 
workers. 
     When the Shortlands manager instructed the strikers to return ‘at once’ or ‘be discharged accordingly’ 
not a single worker turned up, all remaining ‘in their homes’. They were then ordered to ‘get off ’51 the 
estate by January 17th. In a letter to the manager, Godwin Wachira, the C.P.W.U. general secretary, 
‘regretted that such a thing should have happened ....’ and pleaded for discussions ‘formal or informal’ 
as ‘a means of easing the tension’. Recognising the spreading potential of the dispute he made warned of 
the union’s limited ability to contain the strike, that it could ‘ not be responsible for any necessary action 
deemed fit if the situation does not improve.’ Apparently, workers were willing to resume their duties 
‘provided your headman is suspended’. In an attempt to clear a path for recognition, Wachira requested 
that the union officials be given ‘unrestricted access into the workers homes for easy consultation.’ 52 
These efforts though were to come to nothing. 
     All the strikers were duly signed off but ‘refused to come for their pay.’ As the estate management 
took legal action for the eviction of twelve of the eighty-four resident labourers in Thika’s Resident 
Magistrate’s Court, ‘a dozen Kamba employees’53 were taken on as replacements. The Tribal Police were 
again called to protect them and other estate workers who had refused to join the dispute, ‘to prevent 
them being intimidated by the strikers’. Far from containing the struggle, the court action served to 
broaden it, as a ‘crowd of people’ from the estate marched through Thika township early in the morning 
of January 25th to their union’s offices ‘singing as a protest at the management’s action.’54 By this, they 
had taken their struggle out from the estate and into the town. The police arrived at the estate on 
February 6th to evict the workers but found they ‘had removed themselves.’55 The magistrate shortly 
gave final judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and awarded costs against the union. Still unrecognised, 
but with its finances threatened, the union reported an official dispute to the Labour Commissioner.  
     During February there was a short lived recession of the movement with fewer but more qualitative 
strikes. The events at Mongalia Estate reflected the social polarisation which was beginning to show 
itself during the strike wave. The workers at this coffee estate, mostly union members, had come out on 
February 1st with no initial demands though these were later advanced with the removal of a headman 
featuring prominently, supported by a reduction in tasks and shorter working hours. Ironically, whilst 
the Union was quick to deny responsibility for calling the strike it was keen to claim credit for achieving 
a return to work after the strikers were instructed by the employer to ‘go back or be sacked.’56 The 
management sought to take full advantage of the dispute to shed labour, a course rationalised by Watts 
to whom it was ‘abundantly clear’ that many estate workers were ‘redundant’ and that the work force 
could be ‘considerably reduced.’ However, this course was frustrated by serious fissures in the 
apparatus of control as eight headmen sided with the strikers, now considering ‘themselves as labourers 
as opposed to managerial staff.’ These desertions undermined the management and created much 
unease that divisions within authority would give more confidence to the strikers and make it more 
difficult to impose a programme of redundancies without escalating the conflict. Following a union 
instruction to their members to return, the headmen were taken back on the understanding that they 
were to ‘reprove’ themselves ‘by their application and honesty to their work in the future.’57 Like almost 
all other plantation disputes during this phase, union officials were able to entice inexperienced strikers 
back to work empty handed on the understanding that they would sort out their grievances once 
recognition had been granted.  
The Rise of the C.P.W.U. 
     During the course of February the C.P.W.U., lifted by the strike movement, was ‘the most active’ of 
the unions operating within the district. Union branch offices now existed in Thika township and Ruiru 
with others planned in Makuyu, Donyo Sabuk, Kiambu and Nyeri ‘in the near future.’ It was able to 
organise several public meetings during the month  with recognition, strikes and victimisations 
featuring high on the agenda. The district labour officer was reassured after hearing Gachago and 
Wachira  at one such gathering on February 14th, and was able to record that ‘the speakers all adopted a 
more responsible attitude than has been recently shown at such meetings and were at pains to point out 
that strikes should only take place when all other constitutional means had first been tried in an attempt 
to obtaining a peaceful solution.’ Even with its cautious posture, the union’s recruitment campaign met a 
great response with ‘considerable numbers’ enrolling.  
     A mass meeting held at Ruiru Stadium on March 20th was attended ‘by about’ 3,000 workers. In a 
leave it to us appeal Gachago urged them to join their appropriate unions, so that better terms and 
conditions of employment could ‘be fought for them by their union leaders’. He declared to the crowd 
that the C.P.W.U. now had 7,000 members, and condemned as ‘purely absurd’ accusations by 
government officials that workers’ subscriptions had ‘been lavishly spent by the union officials’ since the 
organisation had been officially registered. However, the K.F.L. general secretary Tom Mboya, bowing 
to the Labour Department officials in attendance, lent credence to accusations of union corruption as he 
warned workers to ensure that they got proper receipts for their union dues, and urged collectors to 
work ‘hard and honestly’ for their fellow members. He finished by calling on workers to pay their 
subscriptions regularly instead of spending their money ‘on buying beer’.58 
     During April, Thika’s labour office again reported ‘a considerable amount’ of trade union activity in 
the area, especially by the C.P.W.U.59 A new branch was formed in Kiambu where workers came 
forward to join at an ‘astonishing rate’. Apparently, few workers ‘had any idea’ of the functions of a 
trade union, and ‘they thought’ that by paying their subscriptions ‘their future was assured when the 
day of “freedom” arrived’.60 Other unions were also taking a hold around the district. The Domestic and 
Hotel Workers Union and the Tailors and Textile Workers Union were ‘extremely active’ in organising 
public meetings and recruitment. Riding the strike wave, the T.T.W.U. was able to seal a recognition 
agreement with East African Bag and Cordage, a major factory which drew heavily upon on the sisal 
industry and its many plantations in the area. Unions representing transport, timber and furniture, 
construction and allied trades were also active in enrolment and establishing branches during the early 
part of the year. The Kenya Distributive and Commercial Workers Union was also successful in sealing 
recognition agreements with Kenya Canners and the Kenya Tanning Extract Company. During May and 
June, the local government and civil servants unions followed suit with recruitment meetings of their 
own.61  Recognising the spread of trade unionism throughout the area, the K.F.L. gave approval to the 
formation of Thika Trades Council and assisted by drawing up its constitution. 
     During the course of March the strike wave reached a new peak, with twelve disputes officially 
reported involving 3,563 workers and a loss of 106,691 man hours. The movement had spread beyond 
Thika division and into Ruiru, midway between Nairobi and Thika, where most of the strikes were 
concentrated taking in coffee, sisal, pineapples, mixed farming and textile manufacturing. Some of these 
disputes were fuelled by the disappointment of ‘many Kikuyu’ who had been repatriated during the 
Emergency and were now returning to the area after “goodwill visits”62 to former employers in the Rift 
Valley who were unable or unwilling to take them back.  
     Relationships between workers and employers were ‘deteriorating’ everywhere, even on the Socfinaf 
plantations, reputedly the most ‘enlightened’ in the area, where the company had granted the union 
‘every facility’63 to hold estate meetings. The general manager reported that on two of the company’s 
estates union meetings had prompted ‘a noticeable change in atmosphere’. Whereas before employees 
had ‘appeared happy and cheerful, they are now disrespectful, “going slow”, and demanding that they 
themselves should set the tasks in future.’64 Here was a desire to control the labour process itself, a 
demand far ahead of the minimum programmes of trade unionism and further evidence that some 
sections of workers  were maturing well beyond the raw spontaneity that was evident during the initial 
strike wave.   
     In April, the strike movement ascended to its highest point, surpassing the January explosion and 
negating entirely the February trough. Overall there were 22 reported strikes throughout the district 
with their epicentre again in Ruiru. In sixteen of these disputes, workers were ushered back to work by 
their union officials in all cases empty-handed on the pretext that their grievances would be looked into. 
In seven disputes, workers decided that faced with going back to work on these terms, it was not worth 
returning at all. However, on those estates where workers had been sacked as a result of a strike, the 
Labour Office reported  that employers had ‘found considerable difficulty in building up a new labour 
force’, and that whilst there was ‘plenty of labour in the district looking for work’, some estates were 
blacklisted by work seekers.65  
     Significantly, sympathy strikes were strongly in evidence on those plantations with concomitant sisal 
and coffee divisions.  Sisal Ltd. Plantation in Makuyu was afflicted by a determined 43 day strike  
involving 1,100 workers during which over 200,000 man hours were lost, the longest running plantation 
strike of the period. The dispute devastated the company and reverberated throughout Kenya’s 
plantation economy. The sisal cutters had articulated their grievances against abusive supervision and 
‘undertask’, and advanced demands for increased wages and sick pay after striking in early March.66 
The manager promised to look into their complaints prompting a return to work but nothing more was 
heard from the company. Undertask was a widespread scam and chain of corruption involving all tiers 
of plantation management and supervision. The company had surreptitiously evolved a system whereby 
sisal was cut and tied into bundles of 25 leaves. Whilst workers were required to cut a 100 bundles a day, 
headmen commonly removed leaves from the completed bundles which disqualified workers from 
payment because they had ‘under tasked’. Rejected bundles were then sent to the processing factory. 
With field workers dispossessed of their wages, the payments derived from the cumulative surplus were 
then distributed amongst managers, headman and field conductors. According to retired workers 
residing in Makuyu today67, this system flourished at Sisal Ltd. on the ‘nod and wink’ from the 
European management. Variants of this scam were common throughout the plantation economy. 
     By late March, the dispute had erupted again involving the entire labour force of some 800 workers, 
including domestic servants. Whilst the estate management refused Jesse Gachago permission to 
address the strikers on the grounds that the industry had not yet recognised the Sisal Plantation Workers 
Union,68 the strikers, in face of a return or be sacked ultimatum, insisted that he be granted access to the  
estate. By April 5th, the strike had spread to the coffee division when 300 workers came out in sympathy 
adding demands of their own for higher wages, but went back on April 8th on Gachago’s own 
instructions.69 At this point sisal workers representatives intervened independently of the K.F.L. official 
and presented the estate manager with an ‘agreement’ which dictated their conditions for a return to 
work. They demanded that labourers working without rations should receive 160/- a month, and those 
receiving posho 125/- a month. Masons, carpenters, sisal cutters, stone cutters, workshop mechanics and 
machinists were all to receive 310/- per month with a 10% annual increment. The agreement provided 
for a 45 hour week, gazetted holidays and that ‘Sundays will be treated as a holiday, and will not be 
normally worked.’ Overtime was to be paid at time and a half, and double time on gazetted holidays. 
Demands for leave were also forthcoming, 21 days every 12 months and 14 days sick entitlement on full 
pay. In contrast to past practice, workers also wanted work related injuries to be covered by the 
Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance.70 This was a programme of mature demands that went well 
beyond the singular focus on union recognition and access rights. Indeed, in virtually every dispute 
since January, union officials had been urging workers to accept nothing at all as a precondition for 
recognition. The ‘Agreement’, unconditional and confident in tone, took the K.F.L. by surprise and 
threatened to usurp its role. Like many employers in the district, the company was not ready to accept 
what the Labour Department knew to be urgent and essential if strike wave was to be extinguished, that 
unless union officials were allowed access and recognition the spontaneous upsurge would overtake any 
belated mediation and present employers with maximum demands which were far beyond their means 
to concede.  
     Workers in the coffee division came out again in sympathy on April 11th, but now adopting the sisal  
demands as their own. The management reissued their threat but this time there was no response. The 
dispute, now involving 1,100 workers, entered its fourth week with no sign of resolution. The company, 
advised by the F.K.E., threatened to dismiss all the strikers unless they returned for work on April 25th71, 
but not a single body returned, ‘neither have the employees reported for their discharge’. The manager 
then singled out forty five workers as the ‘ring leaders’ and prepared to evict them in the hope that ‘once 
these people are gone, the rest will then resume work.’72 A magistrate’s order was applied for under the 
Resident Labourers Ordinance for their removal from the estate. Apollo Owiti, a K.F.L. organiser 
assigned to the dispute,  hoped to win a grace and favour type of recognition from the employer, 
through demonstrating that union officials were able and willing to control their members as the 
precondition for brokering plantation disputes. By the end of the month the strikers had returned on 
their union’s instructions but at a price since the ‘ring leaders’ were to remain sacked. With their 
demands sacrificed on the alter of an unconditional return to work, the victimised 45 left in disgust, they 
‘all said they wish to be discharged.’73  
     The dispute at Glenlee estate in Ruiru, seemed to reflect a more aggressive turn to the strike wave 
with both sides digging their heels in and where the  margin of compromise had all but disappeared. 
The estate, owned by M.E.de La Hayes, was situated along Theta Road, the most concentrated coffee 
growing location in Ruiru. Ninety seven Kikuyu workers, all C.P.W.U. members, came out on April 7th  
demanding the removal of the headmen and an increase in wages. Initially the strikers refused to meet 
the management or return to work, ‘stating that they would not consider doing so unless the three 
disputed headmen were removed.’ The Labour Office judged ‘that they had broken their contracts and 
were liable to dismissal’ and that ‘nobody could dictate to the management as to who should be engaged 
and discharged’. The estate manager convened the strikers and made reference to ‘bad men who had 
taken their money and shown them stupid ways.’74 He then read out the names of eleven workers who 
were to be discharged and warned that anyone who had not returned to work by the following day 
would also be dismissed. The strikers stood firm and insisted that if the workers were sacked they 
would ‘all go’,75 whereupon the meeting became festive ‘amidst clapping and singing’.76 The eleven 
‘troublemakers’77 were sacked without pay on April 15th with everyone standing firm.  
      The reputedly arrogant settler de la Hayes subsequently berated Godwin Wachira, that “labour 
relations were excellent before you came into the district… So  much for the education of the workers.” 
Wachira then asked Hayes if he could “address your workers and tell them to go back to work?” Hayes 
distrusted Wachira’s co-operation, alleging that his workers wanted to go back “but they are being 
intimidated and kept away from work by eleven of your members.” Wachira then disclaimed 
responsibility for the strikes in the district which had “not been called by the Union. These strikes are 
illegal.” Even though Wachira then instructed the strikers to return, Hayes threatened him that 
recognition would not be granted unless “you go back and clean up your own office.”78 He later told the 
estate manager that Hayes “was very rude. I do not like to help employers who are rude and I cannot 
help employers who will not help the Union... Have I not stopped the strike on this shamba and 
everybody is going back to work tomorrow? Have I not told the eleven agitators to leave and they say 
they will leave peacefully?... I think I will go home now and leave it like this.”79 Wachira was caught in a 
vice like grip with no margin of compromise, between a determined body of strikers and an intransigent 
employer, but one that made him no less willing to find ways of acceding his members to Hayes’s 
demands .  
     The obduracy of Hayes was not untypical of planters in the district. His anxieties were fed by 
misgivings about Wachira’s control over the strikers. Their disposition was unpredictable and no matter 
how much Wachira demonstrated accommodation, Hayes was loath to accept him as a bargaining 
partner. Attitudes on both sides hardened after the strikers reluctantly returned, empty handed and 
confused by union instructions. The labour office then reported ‘a noticeable “go-slow”... with many of 
them not completing their normal tasks within a day’80, a situation that the vindictive settler was 
determined to turn to his advantage by  setting  a task which ‘no one could do’, involving several days 
labour before their tickets could be marked up. This was the prelude to an attempt to evict the workforce 
with no backpay on the grounds that they had broken their contracts. On the morning of April 25th most 
workers came out on strike again, protesting ‘against this brutal treatment’81, and departed for their 
union’s offices in Thika, but in the absence of any direction from Wachira, ‘elected to be discharged.’82  
   Wachira attempted a neutral ground, pleading for the Labour Commissioner’s intervention as arbiter 
on the grounds that ‘the two parties cannot prove who broke the contract.’ His aim was not to reinstate 
workers to their jobs but to plead for their backpay and unharvested crops83. He was nonetheless under 
pressure and made a rhetorical broadside, that if Hayes did not yield ‘the Union is fully decided to take 
any action it deems necessary directed to this particular Estate if not all’.84 This was a pseudo 
irreconcilability since Wachira had accepted the ‘accomplished fact’ of the sackings and reduced the 
union’s role to recovering back pay.85 His recourse was towards ‘impartial’ state intervention in the hope 
that the Labour Commissioner would save him from strike action. This typically illustrated the outlook 
of Kenya’s union officials and the stand they would take on most issues in the period ahead.  
     Wachira was for dragging out this dispute, thereby awarding credence to the appearance of insoluble 
difficulty, a course which ultimately assisted intervention from the Labour Commissioner. He left the 
issue unattended for some time before contacting the K.C.G.A. in June, by which time his approach was 
starkly non-partisan, believing that it would now ‘be of no use for either the management or the workers 
to judge who was right and or wrong.’ He urged both sides to ‘reach agreement in good time’ or seek 
government intervention for an ‘impartial inquiry’ from which a report would follow. His hopes were 
pinned on prospective legislation ‘to remedy any faults disclosed by such inquiry.’ Wachira promoted 
this outcome in the hope that Glenlee would become a test case and force a way for mediation of the 
strike wave generally and produce the outcome of union access and recognition.  
     The C.P.W.U. saw Glenlee as a key dispute and  laid its hopes on the estate as the site of a resolution, 
however problematic, that could then be turned to the advantage of the would be mediators in arresting 
the strike wave that had engulfed them. Wachira’s turn to the K.C.G.A. was in  anticipation that its 
collective discipline would bring the recalcitrant Hayes to heel. This could create a space for  union 
recognition and access which would facilitate collaboration with the K.C.G.A. Along this road Wachira 
believed that the union could prove its indispensability to the employers as both sides applied 
themselves ‘to promote industrial harmony, efficiency and as contributors to the National Well Being’86, 
but this was not to be. When the Labour Commissioner gave his judgement on the dispute in July he 
came down firmly on the side of Hayes, because the strikers had ‘left their jobs and thereby broke their 
contracts.’ He cleared Hayes of all legal obligations for backpay or compensation to workers for the loss 
of their crops.87 This was a watershed dispute by which, in contrast to previous strikes, the Labour 
Department abandoned all pretence of its erstwhile distance from bad employers. 
     In mid April the Ruiru District Association, aroused by the ‘anxiety and distress’ that ‘was mounting’ 
throughout the area, met to discuss ‘the prevailing situation regarding strikes, and security, in the 
district.’ It resolved to call an emergency meeting of coffee and sisal growers ‘immediately’ with 
representatives of the local administration and the government, at which the ‘anxiety be stressed to 
persons at the highest level of Government’. This took place at the Ruiru Club on May 2nd and its 
importance can be gauged by those in attendance. The Chief Secretary, the Ministers of Labour and 
Defence, the provincial and district commissioners, labour officers from Thika and Kiambu, and 
administration staff from Ruiru, Gatundu, Githunguri and Kiambu gathered to confront the rising tide 
of labour protest. Around sixty committee members of the district associations of Thika, Makuyu, Donyo 
Sabuk, Kiambu and Limuru, representing an area worth £14,000,000 in crops and livestock, told 
ministers and officials of their ‘concern over the flood of strikes’ which had overwhelmed the area. The 
meeting ‘deliberated alot’ and agreed on a round-table conference as the ‘best way’ to handle the crisis. 
Government representative agreed to issue a warning to African workers ‘of the consequences’ of their 
‘failure’ to pick the coffee crop, especially the ‘large amount of revenue the country would lose’ which 
would result in less money to spend ‘on education and other schemes designed to improve the African 
way of life’. This was a retaliatory threat to withdraw the resources and services upon which African 
communities depended.  
     The meeting was quick to dispel any suggestion that the government should intervene in ‘any other 
way’ 88, such as  the use of naked coercion to force labourers to pick coffee. A strike breaking operation, 
especially on the large scale organised during the 1959 rail strike89, seemed impossible given that no 
European or Asian would or could do such work. After ‘considerable discussion’ the assembly resolved 
that a committee should meet the Chief Secretary to discuss ‘how to deal with labour unrest which was 
threatening to disrupt their industries.’90 There was extreme tension amongst employers which 
compelled them to close ranks and call on the state to abandon its already withering posture of 
neutrality. Whilst these forces were of a mind to lash out, the Government preferred mediation. Along 
the former path, given the generalised restiveness of workers throughout Kenya, there was a risk of 
provoking an escalation of the strike movement under conditions where union officials had, as yet, only 
a fragile control over the developing movement.   
 
Appraising the strike movement 
     The Governor of Kenya, Sir Patrick Renison, told the Colonial Secretary ‘that majority of strikes 
occurred without prior discussion or negotiation with employers and that officers of the Ministry of 
Labour experienced quite exceptional difficulties when attempting conciliation’.91 Eventually, the 
Ministry of Labour had been able to bring the K.C.G.A. and the C.P.W.U. to the negotiating table ‘with 
promising results’ in Thika where the strikes were ‘almost terminated…’. Nonetheless, Renison 
acknowledged his unease that the future position was ‘still uncertain because of underlying 
difficulties…’.92 In the absence of any rooted structures of mediation, the state stood to be overwhelmed 
in the face of the uncontrolled spontaneity. Overall, the government feared a faceless antagonist that was 
accustomed to operating beneath the vision and beyond the reach of the state, and was unwilling to be 
dealt with in a predictable and formal way.  
     Renison was vexatious about the political context surrounding the Thika strike wave, which he 
attributed to the ‘unsettling excitement in the present political atmosphere and the unsatisfactory 
security position in the area, both impairing labour discipline.’  His prime concern was that the ‘reasons 
given for stoppages by strikers have not always been clear cut or sometimes even ascertainable.’93 In 
many disputes the causes were unfathomable to labour officers, since few grievances were ever stated94 
creating intractable problems for conciliation.95 The C.B.K. also affirmed that, to a large extent, workers 
‘were unwilling to put forward any reasons for their action and referred the estate management to the 
union representative - who had apparently called no strike’.96 Some explanation for this was given by 
Central Province’s Senior Labour Officer, O.J.Mason, who held that ‘there was seldom evidence that the 
stoppages were instigated by a union’97, but that ‘there was often cohesive organisation of the 
stoppages.’98 Mason attempted to measure the temper and overall disposition of the strikers where in 
‘some cases workers with a long service record assumed a fatalistic “do what you like with me” attitude 
which again reminded people of the uneasy days of 1952…’. Significantly, many of these workers, who 
in some cases ‘had no homes to go to’99, were  prepared to be signed off rather than give way, under 
circumstances of  a labour surplus in Thika and other strike prone districts. The elements of this mood 
shed some light on the rarity with which representations were made to management before disputes 
occurred.  
     The Labour Department was caught unprepared due to the unexpectedly large number of strikes 
which ‘put considerable strain’100 on Thika’s Labour Office.  As the department struggled to carry out its 
industrial relations work, its routine inspections and field work fell by the wayside. John Watts reported 
April as ‘a most hectic month, the telephone has hardly stopped ringing, and at times the office has 
resembled a railway station with numbers of people waiting to get in to see the writer.’101 While the 
department was anxious for its field officers take control of disputes to prevent them from spreading, it 
was hardly able to keep abreast of the movement erupting beneath it. There was a distinct pattern of 
delay in the notification of disputes, too late for labour officers to absorb these shocks waves under 
conditions where the margin of compromise was, in any case, found wanting. O.J.Mason described the 
mood of the strikers as ‘morose, unhelpful and often insolent’, a demeanour ‘reminiscent of the early 
years of the Emergency, and they treated visiting departmental officers, both Europeans and Africans 
with contempt.’102 The Labour Department’s overall strategy, to monitor and take control of the part in 
order to defuse and fragment the whole that was developing, was failing. Given these problems, forlorn 
attempts by the department to arrest the spontaneous movement mostly fell upon union officials who 
were encountering extreme difficulties of their own.  
     Although many employers suspected the C.P.W.U. for starting the strikes, its presence was often a 
help to them as, on many occasions, union officials were ‘able and willing to secure a return to work by 
strikers’.103 Whereas union leaders initially disclaimed responsibility for the strikes and sought to 
disown them, they nonetheless intervened to take control of the strike movement which promoted them 
as a potential layer of sub-contracted authority. Notwithstanding these efforts, the Labour Department 
was alarmed at the strikers growing scepticism104 and impatience with union officials, given their 
tendency in the initial strikes to follow union instructions without question. Early on, it had generally 
appeared as if union officials were behind the strikes though, with few exceptions, they were unwilling 
passengers of the upsurge and worked to channel spontaneous energies into singular demands for 
recognition and access. They were concerned to establish themselves as brokers to assist in arresting the 
movement they had joined. The department was entirely conscious of this duality which it had worked 
to implant105 in Kenya’s labour movement during the Emergency, and  its  agenda was to assist this layer 
to bring the strikes under control. The C.P.W.U. leaders believed they could achieve recognition by 
demonstrating their willingness to wind down the strike movement, through demobilising their 
members and thus proving their indispensability to the employers. Given the pressure they were under, 
they were in some instances prepared to risk a controlled mobilisation of raw recruits, unschooled in 
procedure and impatient for gains, to obtain recognition from the more intransigent and bigoted 
employers. On many occasions the intent of the Labour Department to impose the semblance of 
unionism led by ‘class collaborators’ foundered as labourers adopted these forms as their own and 
transformed them into instruments of struggle. The agenda for using the C.P.W.U. as a vehicle for 
defusing strikes was then seriously jeopardised.  
     That the situation was at least temporarily restored, was due in no small part to the efforts of K.F.L. 
officials Jesse Gachago and Apollo Owiti, along with C.P.W.U. general secretary Godwin Wachira. While 
Gachago was away on K.F.L. business in Casablanca, Owiti was delegated by the K.F.L. to take his place 
as its plantation organiser, and became ‘instrumental in obtaining a resumption of work’ on many 
estates. John Watts believed the ebb tide of the strike movement was ‘mainly due to the efforts’ of Owiti 
who apparently ‘showed considerable concern over what he described as irresponsible striking in the 
district and immediately embarked upon a campaign of visits to all places where strikes were in 
progress telling the strikers to resume work immediately’.106 Overall, the complicity of the C.P.W.U. in 
the strikes was ‘vigorously denied’ by its leadership which worked hard to conclude them. Both 
Gachago and Wachira made no secret that ‘it was their earnest wish the strikes should finish’. They were 
at pains to continually impress on union members that strike action was secondary to all ‘constitutional’ 
means of resolution, ‘a position few strikers could understand’107 especially since, in the absence of 
union recognition and access, there were no operable constitutional arrangements. As the picking season 
approached these issues became paramount. 
     As the bureaucratised form of unionism, mentored by the Labour Department, struggled for control 
over the already existent informal networks cast amongst Kikuyu detainees during the Emergency it 
came up against a syndicalist variant of unionism that surfaced amidst the spontaneity of the strike 
wave. According to Sir Patrick Renison, K.F.L. general secretary Tom Mboya  had told him that 
‘irresponsible agitators have taken charge’ because the employers had denied union officials access to 
their estates to visit union members.108 Union officials were unable to to exercise a commanding 
influence over the rank and file, thus providing a fertile ground for agitators amongst the many former 
detainees to fill the void.  Their agenda to  adopt strikers into ‘unions’ they were fashioning as agencies 
of reconciliation on the terms of the employers, depended on making workers demands negotiable on 
the basis of what seemed possible. Mboya was also likely giving a calculated warning to Renison aimed 
at advancing his position as a political broker : if the employers continued to deny union officials access 
to the workplace, they would lose control and the militants would take over. Likewise if the transition to 
African majority government was to be stable and secure, trade union leaders would need to be 
incorporated at the highest levels of government.   
     According to Walter Coutts, Kenya’s Chief Secretary,  ‘opinion hardened to the theory that the 
unrest’, whilst projected through the C.P.W.U., ‘had been fostered for political motives’. The question 
was by whom? This ‘was one of a number of imponderables interwoven in the situation, which 
exercised many minds.’ Coutts referred to the ‘intimidation of labour’ in the coffee districts and 
threatened a ‘very special exercise’ by the Ministry of Defence to find out ‘who was doing the 
intimidating and why’. Addressing the Legislative Assembly, he described this intimidation as ‘a grave 
difficulty’ and accused a group of people out ‘for their own ends’ of ‘bringing others out on strike who 
had no idea what they were striking about.’ To those at the helm of state it ‘appeared that labour was 
being wantonly led astray’, stirred into action by outside ‘agitators’ and ‘extremists’’109, a view 
reinforced by O.J.Mason who drew attention to the ‘reckless underhand activities of some of the 
movement’s lesser personalities’.110  
     Some credence to these concerns was given by Thika’s wages inspector who was despatched to 
oversee ‘barazas’111 throughout the district. He addressed strikers on various estates, where he ‘noticed 
that the crux of the strikes was mixed up with some political elements. In most cases, youngsters were 
the spokesmen of the strikers, whose ideas were of a political nature and not of plain trade unionism’. 
He reported that the union had enrolled ‘very many members’ all over the district, ‘who apparently join 
without knowing the aims and objects of the union’.112  Sir Patrick Renison told the Colonial Secretary 
that farmers believed there was ‘a recrudescence of Mau-Mau, and that union officials who recently have 
been organising plantation labour are ex Mau Mau’. Indeed, there were not a few former Mau Mau 
amongst the union agitators though a movement involving such large numbers of workers made it 
difficult to identify just who the ‘ringleaders’ were. They operated, as Furedi has argued of Mau Mau, in 
an organisation based on ‘a network of informal ties rather than on an formal system’.113 This movement 
had a life of its own apart from the union bureaucracy grafted onto it. That the mostly casual and 
dispersed physiognomy of the workforce was able to sustain such a generalised wave of plantation 
unrest was attributable to the integration of these workers into communities whose ties had withstood 
the repression and ruptures of the Emergency. 
 
Conclusion  
     The plantation strikes which took place during 1960, a year which ‘was remarkable for its 
unprecedented number of trade disputes’,114 initiated the successive strike waves which plagued 
Kenya’s decolonisation process. The source of the strike movement on the plantations lay in the deep 
crisis on world commodity markets affecting Kenya’s principal export. The precarious fortunes of 
Kenyan planters compelled them to reduce the wages and conditions of their workers as the means of 
compensating themselves for falling prices.115 Fierce productivity drives and unbearable discipline, 
which had plagued the labour process for several years, had triggered  the conflagration. The strikes 
began as initiatives by plantation workers themselves already bonded together by less visible ties of 
association. Indeed, the plantation unions were especially dominated by unrestricted Kikuyu who had 
been convicted of oathing and other Emergency offences, and brought this very recent experience into 
the workplace with them. Dictatorship, repression and dispossession were embedded in the social being 
of the vast majority who entered plantation employment. The employers wanted their labour power 
because of its quality and skill in coffee growing, and assumed that the experience of detention and 
rehabilitation had both taught these workers a lesson and re-conditioned them into embracing their 
subordinate status. They could not have been more wrong.       
     Many strikes contained powerful strains of retribution directed at headmen and nyaparas who had 
been collaborators and loyalists during the Emergency. The harsh nature of supervision compounded 
the depth of grievance against such men. This was of course bound up with the intense productivity 
drives organised by the employers to achieve lower production costs in order to compete with their 
overseas rivals and the rising number of African coffee farmers. Many of the latter’s smallholdings had 
expanded following land consolidation, involving the expropriation of the lands of many of those 
former detainees who were then compelled to enter the plantation labour force. The widespread calls for 
the removal of nyaparas were invariably bound to attempts by strikers to assert some control over the 
labour process itself, in some instances insisting on setting tasks themselves independently of the 
management.  
    The C.B.K. crudely observed that ‘the strikers gained nothing from the skirmish’116, since in most cases 
they had either gone back with no material gains or, in a few cases, decided never to return. Nonetheless 
the strikes were a testing ground where union officials were put into the ring, often against their will. 
How would they handle the employer? What gains could they extract? What would be their stance 
towards erstwhile loyalists? These questions were uppermost in the minds of many strikers.  For Tom 
Mboya, the plantation strikes were an ‘indication of a flaw in industrial relations’ which could only be 
corrected if both sides of the industry ‘play the game according to the rules’117, though almost every 
dispute demonstrated that strikers could not play a game whose rules they had been unable and 
unwilling to internalise. Nonetheless, union officials by and large played this for them as they sought to 
exhaust spontaneous energies by demobilising the strike movement and  tried to collude with labour 
officers and employers to manoeuvre a return to work as a precondition for negotiations, a scenario 
which often evaded them.  
     Kenya’s decolonisation process was beset by the strike prone years of 1959-65.118 This was an 
unprecedented period, far surpassing all previous levels of militancy which left few urban and rural 
sectors untouched.  The recurrent strike waves which attended independence reached a high point in 
May-June 1962, when over 28,000 plantation labourers throughout Central Province struck together in a 
simultaneous strike that touched every estate. Over 1.5 million man hours were lost at the height of the 
picking season. They were joined by workers in tea and sisal plantations, general agriculture, the 
railways, docks, electricity supply, post and telecommunications, banks and airlines, construction, 
engineering, the oil and petroleum industry, chemicals, glass, distribution, tobacco, brewing and 
bottling, food processing, hotels and restaurants, timber and furniture trades, textiles, shoe and leather 
industries, civil and public services who all converged into generalised strike action. The K.F.L.’s threat 
to call a general strike was a backhanded recognition that one was already developing, representing  a 
direct ‘challenge to the National Government on the eve of independence which threatened to cause 
more damage to Kenya than any single disturbance since the Emergency period’.119 Trade union officials 
then intervened in an effort to arrest this movement on the basis of an unconditional return to work, 
though workers were still coming out on strike after it was called off. They were few tangible gains for 
the strikers, which officials believed should be sacrificed or postponed to lend stability to the transition 
to independence. Kenya’s first African majority government appointed Tom Mboya as Minister of 
Labour in order to head off this  movement. Mboya then quickly moved to put the apparatus of the 
Industrial Court in place which severely restricted collective bargaining and made Kenya’s unions 
captive to corporatism. The trade unions then became straitjacketed within these structures in the years 
following independence.  Overall, it became an unwritten precondition for the independence ‘bargain’ 
that the organised working class temper and delay its expectations, though in practice few lasting gains 
were achieved beyond some concessions to a thin layer, of mostly government employees,  who passed, 
under Kenyan conditions,  as a ‘labour aristocracy’120.   
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